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The Effect on Fertility 
of the 2003–2011 War  
in Iraq
Valeria Cetorelli
The increasing concern about the consequences of warfare for civilian popu-
lations has led to a growing body of demographic research. This research 
has been essential in providing estimates of war-induced excess mortality, a 
primary indicator by which to assess the intensity of wars and the adequacy 
of humanitarian responses.1 Research on war-induced changes in fertility is 
much scarcer, although the need to monitor women’s status and reproductive 
health in war zones has been widely acknowledged (Palmer, Lush, and Zwi 
1999; McGinn 2000; McGinn and Purdin 2004; Austin et al. 2008; McGinn 
2009; Patel et al. 2009). This is especially evident in the case of the 2003–2011 
war in Iraq. Several studies have sought to quantify the impact of this war on 
mortality (e.g., Roberts et al. 2004; Burnham et al. 2006; Iraq Family Health 
Survey Study Group 2008; Hagopian et al. 2013). By contrast, virtually noth-
ing is known about the effect of this war on fertility. 
This article provides the first detailed account of recent fertility trends 
in Iraq, with a particular focus on the changes resulting from the war and 
the factors underlying them. The analysis is based on retrospective birth his-
tory data from the 2006 and 2011 Iraq Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys 
(I-MICS). To assess the quality of the data, I calculate retrospective fertility 
rates from each survey by single calendar year and compare fertility estimates 
from one survey with the estimates for the same period from the subsequent 
survey. I then pool the data to reconstruct annual fertility trends from 1997 
to 2010, allowing for comparisons over a period spanning before and after 
the onset of the war. Using decomposition techniques, I quantify how much 
of the change in fertility rates during wartime was accounted for by changes 
in the proportion of married women and how much by changes in the preva-
lence of birth control within marriage. The findings have implications for the 
design of women’s empowerment and health strategies in Iraq and similar 
war-affected settings. 
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Background 
The number of studies assessing fertility changes during war in low- and 
middle-income countries is scant (Hill 2004; Guha-Sapir and D’Aoust 2010).2 
The limited evidence suggests that these changes vary not only in magnitude 
but also in direction, depending on the nature of the war and the pre-existing 
characteristics of the affected population. 
War-induced fertility declines have been documented in a few sub-
Saharan African countries during the 1980s and 1990s. These declines have 
been attributed to involuntary spousal separation and postponement of new 
marriages attributable to military mobilization, accompanied in some cases 
by voluntary efforts to delay or avoid childbearing as a response to economic 
hardship.3 War-induced fertility increases have also been observed in some 
Middle Eastern countries during the same decades. These increases have been 
accounted for by a rise in the proportion of young women married in response 
to security concerns and lack of alternatives, and from limited birth control 
within marriage owing to war-induced pronatalist ideologies and disruption 
of family planning services.4 
To date no study has assessed changes in fertility that may have resulted 
from more recent wars affecting the Middle East since the early 2000s, in-
cluding the 2003–2011 Iraq War.5 Fertility trends in Iraq during this war, as 
well as during the preceding period, have remained largely undocumented 
(Tabutin and Schoumaker 2005; Casterline 2009). It is likely that these trends 
have been affected by the country’s turbulent history and associated popula-
tion policies. 
Saddam Hussein’s regime embraced a strong pronatalist ideology since 
its inception in 1979. High fertility was encouraged through various economic 
incentives, including childbirth cash bonuses and family allowances (Faour 
1989). The 1981–1988 war against Iran and the Iranian superiority in popu-
lation size led Saddam Hussein to further intensify the country’s pronatalist 
approach, with the aim of accelerating population growth. Major restrictions 
on access to contraception were put in place, and penalties for performing 
illegal abortions were increased. Family planning services provided by the 
Iraqi Family Planning Association and the private sector were reserved ex-
clusively for medical reasons (United Nations 1987; Efrati 1999). Only in the 
aftermath of the 1990–1991 Gulf War did the regime finally issue a decree 
allowing the provision of family planning services to all women. During the 
1990s and early 2000s, the Iraqi Family Planning Association received inter-
national assistance under a special dispensation from the UN embargo, but a 
contraceptive shortage persisted (United Nations 2001).6
The conditions prevailing during the 2003–2011 Iraq War are likely to 
have altered previous fertility trends in multiple, and possibly countervail-
ing, ways. On the one hand, the regime change marked a turning point in 
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the country’s population policy. In the post-2003 period, family planning 
services have been actively supported by the government (United Nations 
2011). The wider availability of birth control methods may have fostered a 
decline in the average number of children per woman. On the other hand, 
the post-2003 period has witnessed a deterioration in women’s status as a 
result of widespread violence and rising conservatism (Brown and Romano 
2006; UNICEF 2011). The dire security situation, combined with the resur-
gence of sectarian, tribal, and generally conservative forces, has severely 
restricted women’s possible roles outside the home and may have induced 
many to enter marriage and childbearing earlier than they might have in 
the absence of war. 
The following analysis reveals how fertility changed during wartime 
and identifies the factors underlying these changes. The analysis excludes the 
autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan region, which experienced very different condi-
tions. This region consists of the three northern governorates of Dohuk, Erbil, 
and Al-Sulaimaniya, accounting for about 15 percent of the Iraqi population. 
After the 1991 Kurdish uprising against Saddam Hussein’s regime, these 
governorates became a de facto autonomous region under UN auspices. As a 
result, during the sanction period family planning methods were more easily 
available than elsewhere in the country. Unlike the rest of Iraq, this region 
witnessed virtually no combat during the 2003 US-led invasion and has not 
suffered from generalized violence and insecurity in the subsequent years. 
(A supplemental appendix, available at wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/padr, 
shows that fertility trends in Kurdistan were not altered after 2003.) 
Data
This study is based on retrospective birth history data from the 2006 and 
2011 I-MICS. These nationally representative surveys were conducted by 
the Iraqi Central Organisation for Statistics and Information Technology and 
the Kurdistan Regional Statistics Office, in coordination with the Ministry of 
Health and with financial and technical support from UNICEF (Iraq Central 
Organisation for Statistics and Information Technology and Kurdistan Re-
gional Statistics Office 2007, 2013). In this section, I describe survey designs, 
implementation, and response rates, excluding the sample from the autono-
mous Iraqi Kurdistan region. 
For the 2006 I-MICS, the country was divided into 47 domains, and 
54 clusters were drawn from each domain with linear systematic probability 
proportional to size. A linear systematic sample of six households was selected 
within each cluster. Fieldwork took place between February and March 2006, 
and the household questionnaire was administered to 15,085 of the selected 
households, yielding a response rate of 99.2 percent (Iraq Central Organisa-
tion for Statistics and Information Technology and Kurdistan Regional Sta-
584  e f f e c t  o n  f e r t i l i t y  o f  t h e  2003–2011  W a r  i n  i r a q
tistics Office 2007). For the 2011 I-MICS, 31 clusters were selected within 
each of the 85 Iraqi districts with linear systematic probability proportional to 
size, and ten households were drawn from each cluster by systematic random 
sampling. Fieldwork was carried out between March and May 2011, reaching 
25,984 households for a response rate of 99.7 percent (Iraq Central Organ-
isation for Statistics and Information Technology and Kurdistan Regional 
Statistics Office 2013). 
In both surveys, the household questionnaire was administered to the 
head of each household for, among other purposes, gathering information 
about the age and sex of all household members. All women between ages 15 
and 49 who were members of the selected households were eligible for the 
individual interview. Women’s response rate was 99.1 percent in the 2006 
I-MICS and 98.7 percent in the 2011 I-MICS. Retrospective birth histories 
were collected for all interviewed women who were ever-married at the date 
of the interview. 
Complete and accurate information regarding the birth date of women 
and the date of each of their live births is crucial for a correct estimation 
of fertility trends. In countries, like Iraq, with flawed vital registration 
systems, surveys collecting birth histories from a nationally representative 
sample of women are the most reliable sources for this purpose. Neverthe-
less, reporting errors are critical problems for many of these surveys (Potter 
1977; Goldman, Rutstein, and Singh 1985; Arnold 1990; Marckwardt and 
Rutstein 1996; Pullum 2006; Schoumaker 2011; Pullum et al. 2013). Since 
these errors can distort fertility estimates, it is important to determine the 
quality of the data. 
Both the 2006 and 2011 I-MICS are of good quality in terms of birth date 
completeness. Information regarding month and year of birth is complete for 
95.6 percent of interviewed women and 97.2 percent of their reported live 
births in the 2006 I-MICS, and for 99.6 percent of women and 99.5 percent 
of reported live births in the 2011 I-MICS. However, complete reporting does 
not necessarily imply accurate reporting. 
The two most widely mentioned and potentially serious problems with 
birth history data are omission and displacement of births (Pullum 2006; Sul-
livan et al. 2008; Schoumaker 2011; Pullum et al. 2013). A common error is 
the omission of births that occurred many years before the survey, especially 
in the case of deceased children (Sullivan 2008). Omission and displacement 
of recent births are also common and related to the design of the survey ques-
tionnaires. Like many similar surveys, the 2006 and 2011 I-MICS contained 
a child health module only for those women with children born up to five 
years before the survey. Previous research has found that interviewers are 
inclined to omit some recent births to avoid administering the lengthy health 
module (Schoumaker 2011). The same reason encourages interviewers to 
displace some recent births backward in time, particularly from the fifth year 
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before the survey, which is the last year of eligibility for the health module, 
to the sixth year (Pullum 2006). These tactics tend to cause an underestima-
tion of fertility in the five years preceding the surveys and an overestimation 
in the sixth year. 
When two consecutive surveys are available, as they are here, an ef-
fective approach to detect omission and displacement of births and assess 
the overall reliability of the birth history data is to reconstruct retrospective 
fertility trends from each survey and compare fertility estimates from one 
survey with the estimates for the same period from the subsequent survey. In 
the absence of distortions resulting from data errors, I expect the 95 percent 
confidence intervals of the estimated fertility rates from the 2006 and 2011 
I-MICS to overlap.7 
Reconstructing fertility trends 
Birth history data from the 2006 and 2011 I-MICS can be used to reconstruct 
annual fertility rates from 1997 to 2010. This makes it possible to depict trends 
for a period spanning before and after the onset of the war. The fertility rate 
of women aged x in calendar year t is:
 f
x,t
 = b
x,t
 / e
x,t
 (1)
where b
x,t
 is the number of births observed in calendar year t to women aged x 
at the time of birth, and e
x,t
 is the number of women-years of exposure to risk 
at age x during year t. The 95 percent confidence intervals for f
x,t
 are derived 
from standard errors computed using the delta method (Pullum 2008; Schou-
maker 2013). Because of truncation of the data on older women, the analysis 
of retrospective fertility rates is restricted to women aged 15–39. Since very 
few births occur to Iraqi women at age 40 and older, the downward bias of 
fertility due to the omission of this small fraction of births is negligible. Finally, 
it is important to state that these estimates are based on a sample of surviving 
women residing in Iraq at the time of the two surveys. Women who died or 
left the country during the war are thus excluded. 
Figure 1a displays trends in the total fertility rate (TFR) for women 
aged 15–39 as estimated from the two surveys. Estimates from the 2011 
I-MICS cover the period 2002–2010. The reason is that the oldest women 
whose birth histories were collected in the 2011 I-MICS were aged 49 at the 
date of the interview, and were therefore aged 39 ten years earlier. Birth 
histories from the 2006 I-MICS cover the period 1997–2005. Estimates from 
the two surveys agree closely with each other. Only for the year 2005 do 
the 95 percent confidence intervals not overlap. The difference between the 
two TFRs in 2005 may result from both a slight underestimation of fertil-
ity in the year before the 2006 I-MICS, due to omission of births, and an 
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FIGURE 1   TFRs for women aged 15–39, Iraq 1997–2010
b. Pooled data
NOTE: The dashed and solid lines in top panel are fertility estimates from the 2006 and 2011 surveys, 
respectively.
SOURCE: 2006 and 2011 I-MICS.
a. Data from separate 2006 and 2011 surveys
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overestimation of fertility in the sixth year before the 2011 I-MICS, due to 
displacement of births from the earlier period. Although the estimated TFR 
for 2005 must be treated with caution, the difference between the two rates 
is not large enough to distort the overall fertility trend, which is consistent 
between the two surveys. 
Figure 1b shows the estimated trend in the TFR using pooled data from 
the 2006 and 2011 I-MICS. Pooled fertility rates are obtained by summing 
the number of births from the two surveys in year t to women aged x at time 
of birth and dividing them by the sum of the number of women-years of 
exposure. Two noteworthy points emerge. First, total fertility in 2010 was 
still around 4.5 children per woman, which is fairly high compared to Iraq’s 
neighboring countries.8 Second, the TFR remained remarkably stable, with 
apparently no change after the onset of the war. Total fertility in 2010 was 
exactly the same as in 1997, and annual fluctuations remained below 10 
percent over the entire period. 
However, the TFR reflects both the level and timing of fertility, and its 
stability over time can conceal underlying changes in the age patterns of 
childbearing. To uncover possible variations in fertility trends among women 
of different age groups, Figure 2a displays age-specific fertility rates (ASFRs) 
from the 2006 and 2011 I-MICS. Birth histories from the 2011 I-MICS can be 
used to calculate retrospective fertility rates back to 1997 for the age groups 
15–19, 20–24, 25–29, and 30–34. This means that, for these groups of women, 
the estimated ASFRs from the two surveys can be compared for nine years. 
Over this longer time period and at this less aggregate level, fertility trends 
are consistent. The 95 percent confidence intervals of fertility estimates fail 
to overlap in 2005 only for the age groups 20–24 and 30–34. For all other age 
groups of women, and in particular for those aged 15–19, estimates from the 
two surveys agree remarkably well for all nine years. 
Figure 2b presents the estimated ASFRs pooling data from the two sur-
veys. This figure reveals that the stability of the TFR before and after the onset 
of the war was the result of countervailing fertility trends among younger 
and older women. To examine these trends in more detail, Figure 3 displays 
the annual changes in ASFRs relative to the 1997 rates. The figure shows an 
abrupt shift in the timing of births toward younger ages. From 1997 to 2003, 
adolescent fertility was stable at just below 70 births per 1,000 girls aged 
15–19. However, soon after the beginning of the war, adolescent fertility rose 
by more than 30 percent, reaching over 95 births per 1,000 girls in 2010. This 
increase is striking not only because it moved Iraq from moderate to high 
adolescent fertility,9 but also because a similar increase in adolescent fertility 
over such a short period has rarely been observed.10 
The fertility rate of women aged 20–24 also increased after the onset 
of the war by about 15 percent, from 200 to 230 births per 1,000 women in 
that age group. Only the fertility of women aged 25–29 remained virtually 
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unchanged at around 250 births per 1,000. The increase in early fertility was 
counterbalanced by a 15 percent decline in the fertility of women aged 30–34, 
from 230 to 200 births per 1,000, and a 30 percent decline among those aged 
35–39, from 170 to 130 births per 1,000. It is noteworthy that the fertility 
rates of young women rose suddenly in the post-2003 period, whereas the 
declining fertility trends among older women were already underway a few 
years before the beginning of the war. 
Distinguishing fertility trends by education 
The abrupt rise in early fertility is most likely related to an increase in early 
marriage during the war. Virtually all births in Iraq occur within marriage, 
since extramarital childbearing is subject to strong cultural and religious 
sanctions. Once married, women are generally under social pressure to have 
children as soon as possible. Data from the 2006 and 2011 I-MICS confirm 
that only 1 percent of married women use contraception before having at 
least one child.11 
Previous research has found that in low- and middle-income countries 
women’s education is the most important predictor of age at marriage and first 
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birth. Having secondary education specifically is the factor most strongly asso-
ciated with reduced prevalence of adolescent marriage and childbearing (Jain 
and Kurz 2007; Myers and Harvey 2011). In what follows, I examine fertility 
differentials between women with no education or only primary schooling 
and women who attended (but did not necessarily complete) secondary or 
higher education. The aim is to determine whether there was a change in the 
age pattern of childbearing in one or both educational groups. According to 
the 2006 and 2011 I-MICS, the proportion of women with less than second-
ary education is around 55 percent, with little variation across age groups. 
Figure 4a shows annual trends in the education-specific TFR as esti-
mated from the 2006 and 2011 I-MICS. Estimates are consistent between the 
two surveys, with overlapping 95 percent confidence intervals except in 2005 
for less-educated women. Trends using pooled data are reported in Figure 4b. 
This figure reveals a significant educational gap in TFR, with less-educated 
women having on average 1.5 more children than highly educated women. 
The gap in total fertility between the two groups remained relatively constant 
over the entire period. 
Once again this overall stability conceals very different trends in the 
age patterns of fertility between women with low and high education. Fig-
ure 5a presents ASFRs by survey for less-educated women. Estimates from 
the two surveys agree closely with each other. The 95 percent confidence 
intervals of these estimates fail to overlap in 2005 only for women aged 
30–34. Figure 5b shows estimates using pooled data, and Figure 6 uses 
these estimates to display the annual changes in ASFRs relative to the 1997 
rates. The shift in the timing of fertility toward younger ages was much 
more pronounced among women with less than secondary education than 
it appeared at the aggregate level. 
Soon after the onset of the war, adolescent fertility rose by over 50 per-
cent, from about 85 to 135 births per 1,000 girls. Fertility increased by over 
15 percent among women aged 20–24, from 230 to 270 births per 1,000, 
and remained stable among women aged 25–29 at around 270 births per 
1,000. The fertility decline at older ages was also more pronounced among 
less-educated women than at the aggregate level. Fertility dropped by 20 
percent among women aged 30–34, from 260 to 220 births per 1,000, and 
by 40 percent among those aged 35–39, from 190 to 135 births per 1,000. 
The ASFRs for women with secondary or higher education by survey 
are reported in Figure 7a. Fertility estimates for this group are more erratic 
because of the smaller number of births. Yet, the 95 percent confidence in-
tervals of these estimates overlap for all age groups over the entire period, 
except in 2000 and 2005 for women aged 20–24. Figure 7b shows the esti-
mated ASFRs using pooled data, and Figure 8 displays the relative changes in 
ASFRs compared to the 1997 rates. Before the war, highly educated women 
exhibited lower fertility than less-educated women in all age groups. During 
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the war, highly educated women did not experience any significant fertility 
change. Fertility fluctuated around 45 births per 1,000 among adolescents, 
160 births among women aged 20–24, 210 at ages 25–29, 180 at ages 30–34, 
and 130 at ages 35–39. 
The shift toward early childbearing that occurred only among less-
educated women led to a widening of fertility differentials by education 
among the youngest age groups, especially adolescents. In 2010 the contri-
bution of adolescent fertility to the TFR among less-educated women was 
over 90 percent higher than among highly educated women, whereas in 
1997 it was just over 30 percent higher. On the other hand, the educational 
gap in fertility at older ages gradually narrowed, and in 2010 less-educated 
women aged 35–39 had the same fertility rate as highly educated women 
in that age group. 
A number of questions arise. What were the factors underlying the 
observed fertility changes among less-educated women? Was the sudden 
rise in fertility at younger ages determined by a higher prevalence of early 
marriage during the war? And what was the role of birth control use on 
falling fertility at older ages? The remainder of the article seeks to answer 
these questions. 
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Decomposing fertility changes among  
less-educated women
In this section, I quantify the relative contribution of marital composition 
and marital fertility to the observed fertility changes among less-educated 
women before and after the onset of the war. Under the assumption that all 
births occur within marriage, the fertility rate of women aged x in calendar 
year t can be rewritten as: 
 f
b
e
e
e ex t
x t
m x t
m x t
s x t m x t
,
,
, ,
, ,
, , , ,
=



 +



  (2)
where e
m,x,t
 are the number of women-years of exposure at age x during cal-
endar year t that are spent married, and e
s,x,t
 are the number of women-years 
that are spent single, the sum of the two being equal to the total number of 
women-years e
x,t
. In other words, the fertility rate of women at a given age 
in a given year is the product of the age-year-specific marital fertility rate 
f
m,x,t
 and the age-year-specific proportion of women-years of exposure spent 
within marriage p
m,x,t
 : 
 f
x,t
 = f
m,x,t
 * pm,x,t (3)
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Accordingly, the change in the fertility rate from year t to year t+n can 
be decomposed as: 
 
f
x,t+n 
– 
 
f
x,t
 = 
[½(f
m,x,t+n 
+ 
 
f
m,x,t
) * (pm,x,t+n –  pm,x,t)] 
+ [(f
m,x,t+n 
– 
 
f
m,x,t
) * ½(pm,x,t+n + pm,x,t)] 
(4)
where the first of the two main components on the right side of equation 4 
gives the proportion of the change in the fertility rate stemming from change 
in marital composition, and the second component gives the proportion 
stemming from change in marital fertility.12 I use equation 4 to decompose 
the observed fertility changes among less-educated women comparing the 
pre- and post-2003 period. 
Table 1 displays age-specific percentages ever-married and marital 
fertility rates for less-educated women in 1997, 2003, and 2010. Estimates 
are based on pooled data from the 2006 and 2011 I-MICS. The use of ever-
married rather than currently married women in a specific calendar year is 
dictated by data availability. The 2006 and 2011 I-MICS collected informa-
tion on the age at first marriage for all ever-married women, but did not ask 
about the duration of marriage for those who were divorced or widowed at 
the date of the interview.
From 1997 to 2003, marital exposure to fertility remained virtually 
identical for adolescents and young adult women. The percentages ever-
married were around 21 percent among those aged 15–19 in both years, and 
57 percent in 1997 and 56 percent in 2003 for those aged 20–24. Among older 
age groups, the percentages ever-married declined slightly during this period, 
from around 79 percent to 76 percent among women aged 25–29, from 90 
percent to 84 percent among those aged 30–34, and from 94 percent to 92 
percent among those aged 35–39. 
Meanwhile, marital fertility remained relatively stable among the 
youngest age groups, whereas it exhibited a clear declining trend at older 
ages. The fertility of married women aged 30–34 dropped from about 291 
births per 1,000 in 1997 to 273 in 2003. The decline was more pronounced 
TABLE 1 Marital composition and marital fertility among less-educated 
women: Iraq, 1997, 2003, and 2010
 Percent ever-married Marital fertility rate
Age group 1997  2003  2010 1997 2003 2010
15–19 21.4 21.4 32.0 402.8 403.5 423.3
20–24 57.2 56.1 70.3 421.1 417.7 385.9
25–29 78.8 76.0 84.8 344.3 347.9 319.3
30–34 89.5 84.4 87.9 290.5 272.6 253.7
35–39 93.8 92.1 89.9 207.5 184.2 150.1
SOURCE: Pooled data from 2006 and 2011 I-MICS.
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among those aged 35–39, from 208 to 184 births per 1,000. The fact that in 
2003 married women were stopping childbearing earlier than they did in 
1997 suggests that the fertility transition was underway, despite the pro-
longed pronatalist ideology of Saddam Hussein’s regime and the contracep-
tive shortage in the country. Given the deterioration of living conditions 
during the embargo in the 1990s and early 2000s, this decline in the marital 
fertility of less-educated women may have been the result of economic 
hardship (Baram 2000). 
The period 2003–2010 saw a sharp rise in marital exposure among the 
youngest age groups, with little change at older ages. The proportions ever-
married increased from about 21 percent to 32 percent among adolescents, 
from 56 percent to 70 percent among women aged 20–24, and from 76 
percent to 85 percent among those aged 25–29. The fact that the proportion 
ever-married at ages 35–39 remained relatively stable at around 90 percent 
indicates that during the war women who would instead have married later 
in life entered marriage at much younger ages. As mentioned at the beginning 
of this article, women’s activities and possible roles outside the home were 
severely restricted after 2003 by security concerns and increased sectarian and 
religious conservatism (Brown and Romano 2006; UNICEF 2011). The wider 
prevalence of early marriage compared to the pre-2003 period may therefore 
be essentially due to a lack of alternatives for less-educated adolescents and 
young adult women. 
The increase in marriage during the war was accompanied by a sub-
stantial drop in marital fertility across all age groups other than adolescents. 
This suggests that a larger number of married women were using contracep-
tion both to space births and to stop childbearing. The increased use of birth 
control within marriage was certainly facilitated by the wider availability 
of family planning information and services following the regime change 
in 2003. Nevertheless, it is likely that the reasons for falling marital fertility 
among less-educated women were still largely related to economic hardship. 
It is also possible that a fraction of this decline was the result of an increase in 
widowhood, divorce, and spousal separation during the war. 
Results of the fertility decomposition are provided in Table 2. The first 
column summarizes fertility changes among less-educated women during 
the period 1997–2003. Total fertility declined only slightly during this period 
from 5.3 children per woman in 1997 to 4.9 in 2003. Almost 90 percent of 
this decline was accounted for by lower fertility among women aged 30–34 
and 35–39. Fertility remained virtually unchanged at younger ages, especially 
among adolescents. The second and third columns show that about half of 
the fertility decline among women aged 30–34 was accounted for by a reduc-
tion in proportions married and about half by a reduction in marital fertility. 
For the age group 35–39, over 80 percent of the decline was attributable to 
reduced marital fertility. 
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During the period 2003–2010, total fertility among less-educated women 
rose from 4.9 to 5.2 children per woman. This change was the result of two 
countervailing fertility trends: a fertility increase at younger ages and a con-
tinuation of fertility decline at older ages. Fertility in the age group 15–19 
increased by 0.25 children per woman, with about 90 percent of the increase 
resulting from a wider prevalence of adolescent marriage. In the age group 
20–24 fertility increased by 0.18 children per woman. This increase was over-
determined by a wider prevalence of marriage. Other things being equal, the 
rise in marriage among these women would have increased fertility by 0.28 
children. However, the rise in proportions married was partially offset by a 
reduction in marital fertility. The relative stability of fertility among women 
aged 25–29 was also the result of a combination of increased marital expo-
sure and reduced marital fertility. On the other hand, the fertility decline in 
the age group 30–34 was over-determined by falling marital fertility, and the 
decline in the age group 35–39 was accounted for almost completely by fall-
ing marital fertility. 
 Conclusion
This study is the first detailed account of fertility changes in Iraq during the 
2003–2011 war. I have shown that the apparent stability of the TFR at 4.5 
children per woman was the result of two countervailing trends in age at 
marriage and marital fertility. On the one hand, the decline in marital fertil-
ity, which was already underway before 2003, accelerated during the war. 
The decline was mostly concentrated among less-educated women and was 
likely to have been poverty-driven. Living conditions in Iraq deteriorated dur-
ing the embargo and have failed to improve after 2003. Nearly 25 percent of 
Iraqis live below the poverty line, and many families still rely on the public 
distribution system for basic food items (United Nations 2014; Rawaf et al. 
TABLE 2  Decomposition of changes in the fertility rates of less-educated 
women into changes related to marital composition and to marital fertility: 
Iraq, 1997–2003 and 2003–2010
 1997–2003 2003–2010
 Total Marital Marital Total Marital Marital 
Age group change composition fertility change composition fertility
15–19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.22 0.03
20–24 –0.03 –0.02 –0.01 0.18 0.28 –0.10
25–29 –0.04 –0.05 0.01 0.03 0.14 –0.11
30–34 –0.15 –0.07 –0.08 –0.03 0.05 –0.08
35–39 –0.13 –0.02 –0.11 –0.18 –0.02 –0.16
Total –0.35 –0.16 –0.19 0.25 0.67 –0.42
SOURCE: Pooled data from 2006 and 2011 I-MICS.
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2014). Birth control within marriage may have been fostered by the wider 
availability of family planning services following the regime change and the 
end of the embargo.
On the other hand, the post-2003 period has witnessed an abrupt shift 
in the timing of fertility toward younger ages. Adolescent fertility in particular 
increased sharply after the onset of the war. This is the result of an increased 
prevalence of early marriage, most likely as a response to the dire security 
situation and rising conservatism throughout the country. Insecurity, espe-
cially the actual and perceived dangers of harassment, combined with the 
resurgence of sectarian, tribal, and other conservative forces, prevent many 
women from participating in public life or even from leaving their homes 
without the escort of a male relative. In this context young women may be 
induced to marry early by a lack of alternatives, while families may consider 
early marriage as the best way to protect their daughters and the family’s 
honor. The prevalence of early marriage may have further increased after 
2011, the result of a new escalation of insurgency and sectarian violence fol-
lowing the departure of the last US armed forces. 
This trend is worrisome because it is widely acknowledged that women 
who marry during adolescence tend to have lower status in the home and 
that adolescents who bear children face higher risks of maternal mortal-
ity and morbidity as well as poorer health outcomes for their children. The 
deleterious effects may be magnified by the fact that this phenomenon is 
concentrated among women with little education. The prevalence of early 
marriage and childbearing among women with secondary or higher education 
is relatively low and has not increased after 2003.
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1 Since the early 2000s, a large number of 
studies on mortality in war-affected countries 
have been conducted. See for example Spiegel 
and Salama (2000) for Kosovo; Grein et al. 
(2003) for Angola; Tabeau and Bijak (2005) 
for Bosnia and Herzegovina; Roberts et al. 
(2001), Roberts et al. (2003), and Coghlan 
et al. (2006) for the Democratic Republic of 
Congo; Depoortere et al. (2004), Hagan and 
Palloni (2006), and Degomme and Guha-Sapir 
(2010) for Darfur; and Roberts et al. (2004), 
Burnham et al. (2006), Iraq Family Health 
Survey Study Group (2008), and Hagopian et 
al. (2013) for Iraq. 
2 Fertility declines in European countries 
during World Wars I and II are well-known. 
These declines were largely attributable to 
spousal separation and the drop in the num-
ber of new marriages due to conscription. See 
among others Vincent (1946), Hajnal (1947), 
Winter (1992), Festy (1984), and Chesnais 
(1992). 
3 See Lindstrom and Berhanu (1999) for 
the Ethiopian civil war; Agadjianian and Prata 
(2002) for the Angolan civil war; and Blanc 
(2004) and Woldemicael (2008) for Eritrea’s 
border war against Ethiopia.
4 See Khawaja (2000) for the first Pales-
tinian Intifada; Abbasi-Shavazi et al. (2002) 
for Iran’s war against Iraq; and Yüceşahin 
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